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THE APPARENT INEVITABILITY OF MIXED 
GOVERNMENT 
John Hart Ely* 
There are few positions more demonstrable than that there 
should be, in every republic, some permanent body to correct 
the prejudices, check the intemperate passions, and regulate 
the fluctuations, of a popular assembly. 
-Alexander Hamilton at New York 
Ratifying Convention' 
The "dominant political theory" in England from the mid-
seventeenth century well into the nineteenth was "the age-old 
theory of mixed government."2 As such it was the object of seri-
ous consideration by the founders of our country.3 Its original 
formulation held that the ideal government should comprise 
elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.4 Given the 
circumstances of our separation from England, of course, mon-
archy was expeditiously expelled from the American version. 
However, "the abolition of monarchr had not altered the basic 
postulates of the science of politics," and the general idea here 
became that there should be an executive (elected somehow, 
probably indirectly) to provide energetic action when that was 
needed, a popular legislature generally empowered to make 
policy and provide the rules by which we are governed-and an 
aristocratic branch to moderate between the other two and in 
particular to check their respective tendencies toward despotism 
on the one hand and anarchy on the other.6 
* Richard A. Hausler Professor of Law, University of Miami. 
1. J. Elliot, ed., 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution 301 (WilliamS. Hein & Co., Inc., 1863). 
2. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 36-37,41,60-62, 75, 
117-18 (Liberty Fund, 2d ed. 1998) ("Vile"). 
3. See generally Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 
(W.W. Norton, 1969) ("Wood F'). Cf. Vile at 91-92 (quoting Montesquieu) (cited in note 
2). 
4. Vile at 37-41 (cited in note 2); Wood I at 19 (cited in note 3). 
5. Wood I at 202 (cited in note 3). 
6. Id. at 19, 198,208. 
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Generally this aristocratic element was envisioned as resid-
ing in the upper house of the legislature.' (Some suggested that 
these "senators" be installed for life, others that they be chosen 
by an electoral college.8) For a time there was bruited the notion 
that lineage and property might serve as suitable surrogates for 
wisdom and a deliberative character.9 However, these equations 
drew sufficient fire from such committed democrats as Thomas 
Paine10 to send them (at least officially) into hasty retreat and in-
duce a return to a more direct (though still impure) "wisdom and 
deliberation" rationalization of the Senate.11 
The pattern of the old system of thought was followed, therefore, 
to this extent: the three qualities requisite to an effective system of 
government were enumerated-a concern for the interest of the 
whole, wisdom, and dispatch-and these were related to the need 
to combine democratic and aristocratic elements in the legislature 
with an efficient executive power. In Massachusetts at this time 
the aristocracy was defined as "the gentlemen of education, for-
tune and leisure," and although, therefore, class divisions were ac-
knowledged, indeed welcomed, they were not the heredi~ class 
divisions of the rejected European theories of government.12 
Even such faint nods to aristocracy were too much for some 
of the founding generation, and further "new explanation[s] of 
the position of the senate" were created-that the lower house 
would represent the people, the upper house the states as enti-
ties, or, more intelligibly, that the two houses would not so much 
represent different interests as they would check one another 
and thus contribute to the more general desires for deliberation 
and protection from tyranny.13 
Madison in The Federalist was still trying to fmd a way of distin-
guishing the two houses of the legislature from each other "by 
every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all 
proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican 
government," for the advantage of bicameralism still seemed to be 
"in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies." 
Yet the genuine principles of republicanism were necessarily 
leading others to disavow any suggestion of a different social basis 
7. !d. at 217, 163. 
8. !d. at 213, 216. 
9. !d. at 217-22. Obviously the protection of property against a majoritarian "lev-
elling spirit" was at least an unspoken part of the point here too. ld. at 209, 557. 
10. ld. at 221,223-24, 237; Vile at 121-22 (cited in note 2). 
11. E.g., note 1; Wood I at 556 (quoting Oliver Ellsworth) (cited in note 3). 
12. Vile at 165-66 (cited in note 2); see also Wood I at 556, 557-58 (quoting Alexan-
der Hamilton) (cited in note 3). 
13. Wood I at 237,244-54,558 (cited in note 3). 
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for the upper houses, and were in fact turning them into another 
kind of representation of the people, often of course differently re-
cruited, and with their organization and tenure emphasizing stabil-
ity and continuity, but with their existence justified publicly if not 
always privately almost solely in terms of a functional Whiggish 
division of mistrusted legislative power .14 
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But whatever the shifts in rationalization, the Senate con-
tinued to be envisioned as fewer in number than the House of 
Representatives, older, wiser, and "refined through a filtration 
process" of election not directly by the people but rather by the 
state legislatures. "The resemblance to the aristocratic House of 
Lords and the patrician Senate of ancient Rome was never lost, 
and men continued to invoke the rapidly disintegrating theory of 
mixed government to explain the character of the Senate. "15 
Thus the Federalists may have concocted less elitist ration-
alizations for the upper house, but in their hearts they knew that 
at least to a degree that body would also embody the vestiges of 
mixed government. The term had all but disappeared from pub-
lic debate, apparently forever. 16 However, the wiser heads 
among the Federalists, John Adams most conspicuously,17 under-
stood that the Constitution as drafted and ratified preserved 
much of its essence. 
Whereas the members of the House of Representatives 
were to be at least 25 years old, serve two-year terms, and be 
chosen "by the People," the members of the Senate were to be 
at least 30 years of age, serve six-year terms, and, most impor-
tantly, be chosen "by the Legislature[s}" of their home states. 
As for the President, he was to be chosen by a college compris-
ing "Electors" sent from each state in a number totalling the 
state's Representatives and Senators combined. The document 
further provided that the Electors were to be "appoint[ed] in 
such manner as the Legislature [of the state] shall direct" and 
(there being no requirement that the Electors be popularly 
elected) they were under no obligation in voting for President to 
14. Id. at 254-55. 
15. ld. at 553-54. 
16. Thus, to take an example that prefigures my conclusion, it does not appear in 
contemporary debates over judicial review. 
17. "However much Adams may have leaned towards mixed government in 1776 or 
1780, there was, of course, no chance of such views being accepted, otherwise than in the 
watered-down form of a bicameral legislature and a veto power for an elected governor." 
Vile at 163 (cited in note 2). See also Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American 
Revolution 267 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1991) ("Wood IF'). Adams' relative candor on this 
issue helped account for his (also relative) isolation. Wood I at 569, 575, 586 (cited in 
note 3). See also id. at 554 (quoting Dickenson, Hamilton, and Morris). 
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follow the wishes of the people of the state. (Note the double 
"filtration" here: the state legislature could choose the Electors 
any way it saw fit, and the Electors could vote for President any 
way they saw fit. 18) Thus Adams was right: significant elements 
of "mixed government" survived into the original document. 
Of course much has changed since then. Since the nine-
teenth century it has been the practice in every state for the peo-
ple generally to choose the presidential Electors-prior to that 
some states had the legislature make the selection-and it is by 
now the universal understanding that the Electors are to vote for 
the presidential and vice-presidential candidates a majority of 
the state's people have selected.19 It is true that the Constitution 
has not been officially amended in either of these respects, but it 
has become clear nonetheless that a dispositive deviation from 
either practice would not be tolerated.20 As the Supreme Court 
noted in 1952, the Electors "are not the independent body and 
superior characters which they were intended to be" and thus 
"are not left to the exercise of their own judgment."21 Both fil-
ters are therefore gone: the Electors are elected by the people, 
and they vote for the presidential ticket the people tell them to 
vote for. In other words, the people elect the President.22 
18. "The electoral college was designed by men who did not want the election of 
the President to be left to the people." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,376 n.8 (1963). 
19. In 1872 electors pledged to Democratic presidential candidate Horace Greeley 
felt obliged to vote for him despite the fact that he had died between the general election 
and the Electoral College's vote. EdwardS. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 
1787-1984 at 385-86 (Randall W. Bland, Theodore T. Hindson and Jack W. Peltason eds., 
New York U. Press, 1984). 
20. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 Const. Comm. 
201,203-06 (1996). 
21. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228 n.l5 (1952) (quoting S. Rep. No. 22, 19th Cong., 
1st Sess. 4 (1826)). 
22. It is true that since the early nineteenth century almost all states have employed 
a statewide unit rule giving all of the state's electoral votes to the candidate who wins the 
popular vote statewide. The unit rule was obviously adopted and is retained by most 
states, often defensively, as a way of increasing their clout. The federal Constitution does 
not have anything to say either way about this, although the Twelfth Amendment pro-
vides that when no candidate receives a majority of the electoral vote and the presiden-
tial election is consequently thrown into the House of Representatives, "the votes shall 
be taken by states" and, surprisingly (to me at any rate) each state is to get one vote. At 
least as of 1996 only Maine and Nebraska employed something other than the unit rule, 
electing some Electors by statewide vote and others by congressional district. William 
Josephson and Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. Legis. 145, 161 
(1996). 
Certainly the merits of the statewide unit rule are debatable. For obvious reasons-
A wins a few states by a landslide, B a few others by a nose-the unit rule renders real 
the possibility that the candidate with the highest nationwide popular vote will lose. The 
last time this actually happened was in 1876, when Rutherford B. Hayes was elected 
President despite the fact that his opponent, Samuel J. Tilden, had garnered more popu-
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As regards the Senate, the amendment was more official. 
The Seventeenth Amendment, ratified in 1913,23 provides that 
the Senate is to be elected in the same manner as the House, that 
is, "by the people" rather than the state legislatures.24 Of course 
some differences between the two houses remain, and while a 
couple of them seem faintly relevant, it is difficult to see any as 
making a significant difference to the subject under discussion. 
A member of the House generally is elected by the people of 
only one section of the state, 25 a Senator by the people of the en-
tire state. No reason comes readily to mind for supposing that 
this renders the Senate more "aristocratic" or deliberative, 
though it must to some degree tend to make the Senators less 
parochial (or, at least, parochial in the service of a somewhat 
larger entity). The difference between the minimum ages for the 
two offices obviously remains, but seems unimportant. With 
longer life expectancies, 25 and 30 mus.t seem even less different 
than they did in the eighteenth century, and in any event the 
overwhelming majority of Representatives are over 30. As for 
the difference between six-year and two-year terms, it is too glib 
simply to respond that most Representatives are repeatedly 
reelected. They are indeed, but at the cost of spending some-
thing like half their time in office raising money and campaign-
ing. Assuming that Senators have to spend roughly the same 
amount of time per election cycle engaged in such activities,26 
one year constitutes only one-sixth of their terms, leaving the 
Senators more time for deliberation and putting them in some-
what lesser bondage to shifting popular passions. 
Jar votes nationwide. However, it seems impossible to predict ex ante what blocs of vot-
ers or sorts of candidates are likely to be thus advantaged, rendering the unit rule diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to regard as reinserting an aristocratic element into the system-
questionable though it may be for other reasons. 
23. In fact, "by 1912, Senators were already picked by direct election in 29 of the 48 
states, notwithstanding the language of Article 1." Rotunda, 13 Const. Comm. at 2f17 
(cited in note 20). The story of the devices used prior to the adoption of the Seventeenth 
Amendment thus to circumvent Article I is succinctly told in id. at 206-09. 
24. But cf. Legal Times 13 (June 8, 1998) (Judge Douglas Ginsburg addressing 
graduates of George Mason Law School): 
The path from the original Constitution to our present situation, and why we 
took it, is too long, and too sad, a story for this occasion. In my view, the great-
est mistake (sic) was the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, which in 1913 
provided for the direct election of United States senators. 
25. Seven of the fifty states have only one Representative, whose district is obvi-
ously coextensive with that of the state's two Senators. 
26. To the extent this is inaccurate, one should alter the analysis accordingly. In 
any event the percentage of their members' terms that must be devoted to campaigning 
for reelection differs significantly between the two houses. 
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Finally, and most would probably say this is most important, 
there is the Senate's traditional self-image as a more mature and 
responsible body than the House. We heard much of this-
mainly from the Senators themselves but to a degree from the 
media as well-during the recent impeachment imbroglio. And 
yes, I am aware that the House voted two articles of 
impeachment and the Senate failed to convict on either of them, 
which I join most Americans in thinking the right result. 27 
However, the difference between the votes seems quite 
clearly the result not of any comparative maturity of judgment 
on the Senate's part but rather of two other factors. The first is 
the fact that the House was the charging body, the grand jury if 
you will, the Senate the body whose vote would actually evict the 
President from office-a difference the members of both houses 
simply cannot have avoided taking into account. The second is 
more obvious, that while it takes a simple majority of the House 
to accuse, it takes two-thirds of the Senate to convict. (I am 
aware that the Senate votes were 45-55 and 50-50, each short of 
a majority, albeit one by the skin of its teeth. I am also aware 
that legislators faced with clearly losing causes often vote with 
the winners.) 
Nonetheless, 45% of the Senators voted to convict on what 
had become Article I, whereas 53% of the members of the 
House had voted to send it over. Particularly in light of the fact 
that the House vote was only an indictment, this is not a terribly 
large difference: fifty-three percent does not even flirt with two-
thirds. What had become Article II makes the point even more 
dramatically: true, only 50% of the Senators voted to convict on 
it, but only 51% of the House had voted to refer it! This barely 
amounts to a difference of any sort, let alone one that suggests 
an observable difference between the maturity and deliberate-
ness of the two bodies. 28 (Recall as well that the House rejected 
27. The ambiguity respecting the breadth of my endorsement-it seems pretty clear 
most Americans would not go along with me here-is intentional. Am I the only one 
who thinks impeachment without conviction may have been about right? I do not regard 
self-serving one-sided "sex" between the most powerful man on earth and a physically 
unremarkable and understandably starstruck 22-year-old subordinate as a simple case of 
sex "between consenting adults." Beyond that, perjury and obstruction of justice are 
felonies, even when in context they are not, as I said early and publicly, the sort of "high 
crimes and misdemeanors" that warrant removing the President from office. ("Low" is 
the adjective that comes more readily to mind.) 
28. A number of Senators suggested another way in which the House had behaved 
with inadequate maturity and deliberation: by voting almost entirely along straight party 
lines. See, e.g., New York Times A22 (Feb. 12, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Tim Johnson, 
Democrat of South Dakota): 
I think [our votes send] a very loud message to the House of Representatives. 
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the other two articles of impeachment its judiciary committee 
had recommended, one of them by essentially a two to one 
vote.) If it's maturity you seek, and like me you regard a disposi-
tion not to evict President Clinton as a sign ther~o~, tg- t~e 
American people, only 31% of whom favored conVIction. Its 
enough to tempt one to identify the people generally as the true 
aristocracy, were that not to drain the term of all meaning. 
I don't know about you, but when Chief Justice Rehnquist 
entered the Senate Chamber, I felt much as I did at the end of 
William Golding's Lord of the Flies: Thank God, everything's 
going to be all right. A grownup has arrived. 
I suppose that vignette gives my thesis away: that despite 
the substantial assimilation of the character of the Senate to that 
of the House of Representatives, mixed government survives. 
For all the while the role of the Senate as a comparatively sober, 
well-educated, and only indirectly elected elite was on the wane, 
the comJ'arable role of the Supreme Court was symmetrically 
waxing. The Court, indeed the entire federal judiciary, is a 
comparatively old, well-educated, isolated, thoughtful, and wise 
institution whose input into the laws that govern us is significant. 
Don't ever, ever, send to the Senate again articles of impeachment that are this 
weak and partisan. 
Weak maybe, though we've seen that just about the same percentage of Senators voted 
for them as Congressmen. Partisan? The truth is that both houses behaved in disturb-
ingly partisan ways. In the House the Republicans voted 98% and 95% for the two arti-
cles that were adopted, the Democrats 98% and 98% against them. On the two articles 
that didn't make it out of the House, however, there were Republican "defection" rates 
of 12% and 36%. In the Senate the Republicans voted in 82% and 91% blocks in favor 
of the charges, thereby lending some substance to Mr. Johnson's implied claim of lesser 
Senate partisanship. However, neither pany in the House (nor the Senate Republicans) 
matched Mr. Johnson's very own team, the Senate Democrats, who voted 100% (45.()) 
against both anicles! 
29. New York Times A16 (Feb. 3, 1999). 
30. In the early days American judges were often "aristocrats," including some who 
were not even lawyers, and their decisions were expected to, and undoubtedly did, reflect 
their socially elevated status. Wood II at 71·72, 323-34 (cited in note 17). However, prior 
to Marbury judicial jurisdiction was necessarily, and even thereafter it was in fact almost 
exclusively, a common law jurisdiction, not involving the constitutional invalidation of 
statutes or other work of the political branches. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, de-
cided in 1856 and notoriously invalidating the Missouri Compromise, was only the sec-
ond Supreme Court decision striking down an act of Congress (Marbury itself being the 
first). 
Dred Scott was also the first Supreme Court decision to invoke the documentally 
unprovided, for that matter oxymoronic, doctrine of "substantive due process," essen-
tially authorizing a judicial second-guess of the wisdom of legislation pursuant to no par-
ticular constitutional command but rather to some undefined amalgam of the Court's 
estimations of American tradition and right reason-obviously the very sort of jurisdic-
tion an advocate of judicial participation as the aristocratic element in a "mixed govern-
ment" would think appropriate. 
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Marbury v. Madison, written by his appointee John Marshall and 
mining from the Constitution the institution of judicial review, 
must have made John Adams dance a-well, crack a smile any-
way. Six years, horsefeathers: try a life term. 
If I had my way, the Supreme Court would not function as 
an engine of mixed government. Democracy and Distrus(1 is an 
extended argument for the proposition that the Court should not 
act as an elite impediment to what it takes to be the substantive 
excesses of the politically responsible branches but, on the con-
trary, as a perfecter of the democratic process. You will not be 
surprised to learn, however, that I do not always have my way: 
Democracy and Distrust is characteristically the object of ritual 
compliment and rapid dismissal.32 
Instead, the currently dominant academic theory of judicial 
review is one that would importantly involve the judges in as-
sessing the wisdom of the democratic branches' choices.33 
Whether it is Laurence Tribe telling the justices it is their job to 
make "difficult substantive choices among competing values, and 
indeed amon~inevitably controverted political, social, and moral 
conceptions," or Ronald Dworkin assuring them that it "is too 
late for the old, cowardly, story about judges not being responsi-
ble for makinfo" such choices, "or that it is undemocratic for 
them to try,"3 the message is clear: government by the people 
may be an ennobling myth, but sometimes the people get it 
wrong, and as the reflective elite element in our law-making sys-
tem, the justices must keep them within the bounds of what is 
acceptable to the reasoning class. 
31. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard 
U. Press, 1980). 
32. Or worse. See, e.g., Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism 90 
(Yale U. Press, 1996) ("Although Ely's effort on Warren's behalf proved herculean, aca-
demic lawyers of all ideologies responded with groans .... "); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 841 
F.2d 1329, 1356 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (entire footnote) ("That 
Dean John Hart Ely has 'severely criticized' Roe v. Wade, maj. op. at 1341 n.21, makes 
the majority's position no more persuasive and Roe v. Wade no less binding or important 
a constitutional decision"). In light of the results of Professor Kalman's survey, I would 
have thought my critique of Roe had probably strengthened its authoritativeness. 
33. Fortunately, the justices are only intermittently convinced, with the result that 
our system can quite justifiably be labeled democratic, most of the time. 
34. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 584 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 
1988). 
35. Ronald M. Dworkin, Freedom's Law 38 (Harvard U. Press, 1996). (I confess I 
find elusive the sense in which it is "cowardly" to trust the judgment of the citizenry at 
large, rather than preserving a veto for people like ourselves.) 
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Such recommendations turn my stomach, but I'm a demo-
crat:36 except where the majority is subjecting some despised or 
negatively stereotyped minority to inferior treatment or effec-
tively barring its members from the process of governing,37 I 
simply cannot understand by what right the educated elite can 
lay claim to any sort of veto on the collective judgment of its 
(okay, our) fellow citizens.38 But though I don't buy it, I can un-
36. In my more paranoid moments I begin to feel as if, at least among constitutional 
theorists, I'm the only one. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: 
Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 Const. Comm. 271, 274 (1997) 
(footnotes omitted): 
Conservative constitutional commentators insist that principled justices would 
sustain bans on abortion and strike down affirmative action policies; their lib-
eral peers insist that principled justices would strike down bans on abortion and 
sustain affirmative action policies. Libertarians would have justices strike down 
bans on abortion and affirmative action policies; democrats would have justices 
sustain both measures. 
Two or three commentators are cited for each school, save ~democrats," where I am the 
only one. (Parenthetically, I am also an unacknowledged counterexample to what Gra-
ber thinks all this proves, that ~Controversial cases in leading studies consistently come 
out 'right,' as 'right' is defined by the theorist's political commitments." Id. I've always 
been opposed to laws of the sort struck down in Roe, and said so in my criticism of that 
case. For the most part, though, I expect he is right.) And of course-the paranoia's 
lifting-l'm not the only democratic constitutional theorist: Why, there's Jurgen Haber-
mas, and Henry Monaghan, and Mike Klarman, and ... let me get back to you on this. 
37. See also Martin Luther King, Jr., ~Letter from the Birmingham Jail," in Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Why We Can't Wait 85-86 (Harper & Row, 1964): 
Let us consider a more concrete example of just and unjust laws. An unjust law is a 
code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but 
does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. By the same token, a 
just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is willing to 
follow itself. This is sameness made legal. 
Let me give another explanation. A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority 
that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in enacting or de-
vising the law. 
Actually, given the proclivities of legislatures, these two exceptions generate a quite en-
ergetic theory of judicial review and justify most of the modem Court's "activism." See 
Ely, Democracy and Distrust chs. 5 & 6 (cited in note 31 ). 
38. It is true that from time to time there have been inserted in the Constitution 
provisions (surprisingly few, actually) that cannot without some questionable pulling and 
hauling be made to conform to either of these accounts-provisions that, candidly con-
sidered, protect against legislative interference with some nonparticipational, nonegali-
tarian value their supporters thought unusually important. True, at the time the provi-
sion was inserted its supporters commanded the substantial (elected) supermajority 
required to enact a constitutional provision: two-thirds of each house of Congress plus a 
majority in at least three-quarters of the state legislatures. Nonetheless, enforcing the 
substantive value judgments of people no longer alive, no matter how overwhelming 
their majority, may seem only marginally less "undemocratic" than having appointed 
judges impose their substantive values. Democracy and Distrust at 8-12 (cited in note 31). 
However, values that are neither participational nor egalitarian do not belong in a 
constitutive document, at least not in ours. Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at 
Mid-Century, 6 J. Leg. Educ. 457, 463-64 (1954). It is therefore no surprise to find that 
whenever such constitutionally sheltered substantive values have posed a real threat to 
contemporarily popular policy, they have been quite expeditiously expelled from the 
Constitution, by either official (Article V) or judicial amendment. Ely, Democracy and 
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derstand the contrary position, that intelligent, reflective people 
are likely to be, well, more intelligent and reflective than the 
masses and "therefore" their views on how the nation should 
govern itself should be entitled to special weight, an ultimate 
veto when necessary. The idea obviously did not originate with 
John Adams or his contemporaries: it dates back at least as far 
as Plato39 and Aristotle. 40 
Thus although mixed government is not the theory that best 
fits our constitutional charter, especially as it has evolved 
through amendment,41 it possesses an ancient alternative pedi-
gree. And given that the educated and well-born will inevitably 
exercise disproportionate influence in determining our form of 
government, I suppose it is virtually inevitable. But please, gang, 
admit that what you're advocating is a mixture of government by 
the people generally and government by an unelected elite com-
prising people like yourselves. Stop calling it democracy. 
Distrust at 99-100 (cited in note 31). 
39. B. Jowett, ed., Laws, Ill, The Dialogues of Plalo, V, 72-75 (Oxford, 3d. ed. 
1892}. 
40. Politics, II, 6, pp. 60-61; IV, 9, pp. 177-84; V, 9, p. 232. See generally Kurt von 
Fritz, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity (Columbia U. Press, 1954). 
41. Democracy and Distrust at 88-101 (cited in note 31}. 
